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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

VOL. 58

THE DOMINANT ELEMENT RULE
By
HOWARD NEWCOMB MORSE*

The Appellate Department of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
California, in 1938 in People v. Settles declared that: "A game is not to be regarded as one of skill merely because that element enters into the result in some
degree, or as one of chance solely because chance is a factor in producing the resuit. The test of the character of a game or scheme as one of chance or skill is
which of these factors is dominant in determining the result .... If both of these

factors are present, the question of the character of such game or scheme in this
respect is ordinarily one of fact."' A game in which the players participate in the
selection of the numbers and in which the proficiency of the players in so selecting
the numbers determines the winner is a game in which skill rather than chance
constitutes the dominant element. The acid test is whether without skill it is absolutely impossible to win the game. It was brought out by expert testimony paraphrased by the Superior Court of New Jersey in 1952 in O'Brien v. Scott that:
games of skill and chance are set off by two fundamental criteria. First, an
expert or skilled player can win a substantial majority of games of skill from a
novice or unskilled player; and second, in a game of skill which is won by the
lowest score, an expert or skilled player will make, on the average, a substantially
lower score than a novice or unskilled player. Neither of these results is true in a
game of 'chance'." 2
In the event of police interference it is better from the standpoint of the
operator of the game to wait and submit to arrest rather than to seek a declaratory
judgment, as in Thrillo, Inc. v. Scott,8 or an injunction, as in Cotroneo v. Townsend,4 for in the first case the State must carry the extraordinary criminal burden
of proof by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the game is predominantly
one of chance while in the latter two cases the burden of proof is on the operator
to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the game is primarily one of skill.
Whether the operator or the State has the burden of proof can mean the difference
to the operator of having to close his business or of being allowed to continue it
as most dosed-participation, multiple-participation, player-participation games include both skill and chance and pose relatively close questions. As the Supreme
Court of New York stated in 1952 in the Cotroneo case: "The plaintiff has failed
therefore to establish as a matter of law that this game is not a lottery and hence
has failed to establish a clear legal right to injunctive relief."' 4 And as thL court
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NOTES

declared in the Settles case: "The defendants requested this further instruction No.
7: 'I instruct you that unless you are satisfied from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the game conducted by defendants was a game of chance, then it
is your duty to find the defendants not guilty.' This was a correct instruction. The
court modified it and gave it as follows: 'I instruct you' that if you are satisfied
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the game conducted by defendants was a game of skill or science and not of chance, then it is your duty to
find the defendants not guilty.' This instruction as modified implied that the
burden was upon defendants of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the game
conducted by them was one of skill. This is not the law. The defendants would
be entitled to an acquittal if the evidence raised in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt on this point."
It is submitted that for the operator to exact a participation fee rather than
an admission fee is indicative that the game is primarily one of skill. The Supreme
Court of Florida observed in 1938 in Creash v. State that: "It is also banned as
gambling if created as in this case by paying admissions to the game." 5 It is also
submitted that for the operator to have the attendant who sells the combination
cards to the participants receive tips voluntarily given by the participants rather
than a salary from the operator is indicative of the game being one in which skill
predominates. In the Creash case the court in condemning the game as gambling
pointed out that: "All entrance fees are paid into a common fund of the operator
out of which is paid all operating expenses of the establishment, including salaries."
It is further submitted that for the operator to conduct a game anew each time there
is a winner rather than at regular time intervals is indicative that the game is primarily one of skill. In the Creash case the court went on to say that: " . . . such
games are run off at regular time intervals." And, finally, it is submitted that for
the operator to pay as the prize per game the sum of money collected from th'e
sale of the combination cards rather than having the amount of the prize predetermined, as in the Creash case, or paying as the prize per game the sum of
money collected from the admission fees, as in Hoffman v. State. In the Creash
case the court observed that: "All entrance fees go into this account, but the
amount or value of the prize offered is always in the bank account before any
entrance fees are paid and the prize is in no sense determined by the number of
such fees paid." The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in 1949 in the Hoffman
case pointed out that: "We may properly assume, therefore, that his outlay in
money prizes . . . was entirely dependent upon intake at the box office, i.e., admissions of participants in the skill game, and bearing a relationship to these admission fees in some fixed ratio or percentage." 6
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